With the face of a child and the body of a woman, tiny Rhonda Williams was suffering from some severe emotional and physical traumas. Her mother had died when she was very young and her father was an intimidating man. Then her first love, a boy named Frank Aguirre, disappeared suddenly. Recently, she had sprained her foot in an accident. While she painfully convalesced, her relationship with her father became increasingly strained and he banned many of her friends from visiting the house. Wayne was the only one of her friends that her father liked.
That night, frightened by her father's anger after he had too much to drink, she packed an overnight bag and decided to get away from the house until he sobered up. Wayne left Tim at a laundromat nearby and went to the house to get Rhonda. She was too afraid to unlock her bedroom door to let Wayne in, so he came to the window to escort her from the house. The two of them then met Tim Kerley at the laundromat.
Wayne told Rhonda that they were going to Corll's house. She didn't want to go there, but finally agreed. Tim gave her a beer to drink.
The three teenagers reached Corll's house around 3 a.m.. Rhonda did not realize that Corll was infuriated that the two boys had brought a female to the house, but she knew that something was wrong. Henley was able to take the edge off Corll's anger and the small party started back up again. While Corll smoked pot and drank beer, the boys drank some moonshine that Wayne's dad had given him. Rhonda joined them in smoking some pot and fell asleep while sitting against the wall.
Hours later Henley awakened to Corll handcuffing his wrists. His ankles had already been bound together. From much previous experience, Henley understood that torture and painful death were imminent. Looking around him, he saw that Tim had been stripped and both of his friends had been bound with rope. Electrical tape sealed their lips.
" I'm gonna kill you all!" Corll shrieked, according to Henley. "But first I'm gonna have my fun."
Henley pleaded with Corll: He would help Corll torture Tim. Corll could assault Tim and he would rape Rhonda. Then they would kill Tim and Rhonda together.
After threatening Henley with a .22 caliber pistol and a knife, Corll relented and took off the handcuffs and ropes. Corll told Henley that if he did not do something to Rhonda that he, too, would be a victim.
Thursday, February 11, 2010
Saturday, January 30, 2010
shipmates 33.ship.772 Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire
The degree from a top-flight chef's school enabled Hadden Clark to pick and choose employers — at first. But he was never able to keep a job for more than a few months. His strange behavior, like openly chugging beef blood in a restaurant's kitchen, did not endear him to fellow employees or employers. His first jobs were in Provincetown on Cape Cod, where years later he would confess to killing several women in the sand dunes nearby. On one such occasion, he claimed to have murdered a young woman burying her nude under a sand dune after first removing her hands at the wrists. Hadden told police he used her fingers as experimental bait for surf fishing, a hobby he had become proficient in while living on the Cape.
After becoming shunned by restaurant owners in the beach towns of Massachusetts, Hadden Clark did a one-year stint on the cruise ship S/S Norway. After that, there were jobs in Long Island banquet halls, and a three-week assignment at the 1980 Olympics in Lake Placid, New York. In all, Hadden Clark would hold 14 different jobs between 1974 and 1982.
During that time his family disintegrated further. His grandfather died and his grandmother, in poor health, entered a nursing home. His parents divorced, with his father dying soon after from cancer. Hadden, an unsuspected murderer many times over, entered the U.S. Navy as a below deck cook. It was his last chance at a career. But his shipmates didn't understand a sailor who often wore frilly ladies' panties under his uniform. There were beatings. Once, he was locked in a meat freezer for three hours. The Navy tried moving him to new ships but there were incidents. After a final beating where he suffered a concussion from his head being banged against an aircraft carrier's deck, Hadden was given a medical discharge, diagnosed as a paranoid schizophrenic. He soon showed up on his brother Geoff's doorstep, which resulted in the brutal killing of little six-year old Michele Dorr, with the police believing that her father and not Hadden Clark was their prime suspect.
After becoming shunned by restaurant owners in the beach towns of Massachusetts, Hadden Clark did a one-year stint on the cruise ship S/S Norway. After that, there were jobs in Long Island banquet halls, and a three-week assignment at the 1980 Olympics in Lake Placid, New York. In all, Hadden Clark would hold 14 different jobs between 1974 and 1982.
During that time his family disintegrated further. His grandfather died and his grandmother, in poor health, entered a nursing home. His parents divorced, with his father dying soon after from cancer. Hadden, an unsuspected murderer many times over, entered the U.S. Navy as a below deck cook. It was his last chance at a career. But his shipmates didn't understand a sailor who often wore frilly ladies' panties under his uniform. There were beatings. Once, he was locked in a meat freezer for three hours. The Navy tried moving him to new ships but there were incidents. After a final beating where he suffered a concussion from his head being banged against an aircraft carrier's deck, Hadden was given a medical discharge, diagnosed as a paranoid schizophrenic. He soon showed up on his brother Geoff's doorstep, which resulted in the brutal killing of little six-year old Michele Dorr, with the police believing that her father and not Hadden Clark was their prime suspect.
Sunday, January 17, 2010
substance 44.sub.003 Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire
When toxicologist Julie Evans filed her report on the cause of Ms. Grundy's death, Det. Supt. Postles was astounded.
The morphine level in the dead woman's body was the cause of death. Not only that, her death would have occurred within three hours of having received the fatal overdose.
Postles later said Shipman's use of the drug was a serious miscalculation. A doctor would surely have known morphine is one of the few poisons that can remain in body tissue for centuries. Postles observed, "I was surprised... I anticipated that I would have had difficulty if he gave them something in way of poison lost in background substance." He gave insulin, which the body produces naturally, as an example. "It was an unexpected bonus once I had checked that Kathleen Grundy did not take it herself."
Shipman would claim later that the stylish and conservative old lady was a junkie. Even today psychologists speculate on the possibility that he wanted to be caught. Otherwise, why would he hand them the typewriter and use a drug so easily traced back to him? Others believe he saw himself as invincible, believing that, as a doctor, his word would never be questioned.
The detective realized the case went far beyond one death, and the scope of the investigation was broadened immediately.
The morphine level in the dead woman's body was the cause of death. Not only that, her death would have occurred within three hours of having received the fatal overdose.
Postles later said Shipman's use of the drug was a serious miscalculation. A doctor would surely have known morphine is one of the few poisons that can remain in body tissue for centuries. Postles observed, "I was surprised... I anticipated that I would have had difficulty if he gave them something in way of poison lost in background substance." He gave insulin, which the body produces naturally, as an example. "It was an unexpected bonus once I had checked that Kathleen Grundy did not take it herself."
Shipman would claim later that the stylish and conservative old lady was a junkie. Even today psychologists speculate on the possibility that he wanted to be caught. Otherwise, why would he hand them the typewriter and use a drug so easily traced back to him? Others believe he saw himself as invincible, believing that, as a doctor, his word would never be questioned.
The detective realized the case went far beyond one death, and the scope of the investigation was broadened immediately.
Saturday, January 9, 2010
books 44.boo.00300 Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire
# He was very immature -- the games, magazines, choice of child target. The fact that he did not sexually assault lends credence to this. He masturbated on the victims but did not rape.
At the same time, he is very patient in his crimes, stalking and killing without detection. This makes him a paradox, which in and of itself would be disturbing even to him.
I do feel like he is very comfortable with books and would have many of them in his home. Not just a few, many, many books. True crime as well as books, which feed his fantasies. I feel as if they would be found all over his house. He was smart, highly intelligent.
This is not someone who is heavily into drugs/alcohol. They do not cause his crimes. He may drink at times, but that would not be an excuse for the murders.
# He had a car, which would have been dark in color as well. However, this is a person who would enjoy walking around neighborhoods looking at people and victims.
# Due to his immaturity, he would be comfortable with people much younger than him. He would not have many friends, only acquaintances who really do not know him. All of his relationships would be superficial. He would not be married, and any history with women would be short-lived and meaningless.
At the same time, he is very patient in his crimes, stalking and killing without detection. This makes him a paradox, which in and of itself would be disturbing even to him.
I do feel like he is very comfortable with books and would have many of them in his home. Not just a few, many, many books. True crime as well as books, which feed his fantasies. I feel as if they would be found all over his house. He was smart, highly intelligent.
This is not someone who is heavily into drugs/alcohol. They do not cause his crimes. He may drink at times, but that would not be an excuse for the murders.
# He had a car, which would have been dark in color as well. However, this is a person who would enjoy walking around neighborhoods looking at people and victims.
# Due to his immaturity, he would be comfortable with people much younger than him. He would not have many friends, only acquaintances who really do not know him. All of his relationships would be superficial. He would not be married, and any history with women would be short-lived and meaningless.
Monday, November 16, 2009
generation 7.gen.993 Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire
The Demon Barber Sweeney Todd is the English bogeyman: the character older children call upon to frighten their friends and younger children. Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire Unruly youngsters are cautioned against misbehaving with threats of being attacked by Sweeney and served up in a meat pie.
To most people, the Demon Barber who used a trap door and trick chair to slaughter his clients was the stuff of urban legend. After all, the events connected with his story are almost unbelievable. His exploits prey upon very common human fears: being attacked while vulnerable, and being served up as food or unknowingly consuming someone else. Who hasn't sat in the chair and felt a shiver as the barber or hair dresser takes out that straight razor, sharpens it on the strop and then applies it to the back of the neck? Or taken a bite of a meal and wondered just what the origin of the hair in the hamburger was? So it was for years, as the legend of Sweeney Todd was passed on from generation to generation, people wrote off the story as pure fiction.
But most myths and legends have a basis somewhere in truth, and Sweeney Todd is no different. There really was a mad barber, he really did use a trapdoor and straight razor to rob and kill customers, and most did end up as filling for meat pies. Extensive, painstaking research by British author Peter Haining has shown this without a doubt. Todd's life and exploits are not nearly as romantic as Sondheim would have us believe, but then who would pay to see a movie or musical about a psychopathic mass murderer unless there was more to the story?
What follows is the true story of the Demon Barber of Fleet Street. There is little romantic or even melodramatic about the life and times of Sweeney Todd. He was an amoral, bitter man who lusted for money and was not averse to killing to get it.
To most people, the Demon Barber who used a trap door and trick chair to slaughter his clients was the stuff of urban legend. After all, the events connected with his story are almost unbelievable. His exploits prey upon very common human fears: being attacked while vulnerable, and being served up as food or unknowingly consuming someone else. Who hasn't sat in the chair and felt a shiver as the barber or hair dresser takes out that straight razor, sharpens it on the strop and then applies it to the back of the neck? Or taken a bite of a meal and wondered just what the origin of the hair in the hamburger was? So it was for years, as the legend of Sweeney Todd was passed on from generation to generation, people wrote off the story as pure fiction.
But most myths and legends have a basis somewhere in truth, and Sweeney Todd is no different. There really was a mad barber, he really did use a trapdoor and straight razor to rob and kill customers, and most did end up as filling for meat pies. Extensive, painstaking research by British author Peter Haining has shown this without a doubt. Todd's life and exploits are not nearly as romantic as Sondheim would have us believe, but then who would pay to see a movie or musical about a psychopathic mass murderer unless there was more to the story?
What follows is the true story of the Demon Barber of Fleet Street. There is little romantic or even melodramatic about the life and times of Sweeney Todd. He was an amoral, bitter man who lusted for money and was not averse to killing to get it.
Thursday, September 24, 2009
reports 7.rep.993 Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire
SEARCH FOR RECORDS
In searching for government records on the Roswell crash, we were particularly interested in identifying and reviewing records of military units assigned to RAAF in 1947--to include the 509th Bomb Group, the 1st Air Transport Unit, the 427th Army Air Force Base Unit, and the 1395th Military Police Company (Aviation).
Document disposition forms obtained from the National Personnel Records Center in St. Louis, Missouri, indicate that in 1953, the Walker Air Force Base (formerly RAAF) records officer transferred to the Army's Kansas City records depository the histories of units stationed at Walker Air Force Base. These histories included the 509th Bomb Group and RAAF for February 1947 through October 1947; the 1st Air Transport Unit for July 1946 through June 1947; and the 427th Army Air Force Base Unit for January 1946 to February 1947. We could not locate any documentation indicating that records of the 1395th Military Police Company (Aviation) were ever retired to the National Personnel Records Center or its predecessor depositories.
The July 1947 history for the 509th Bomb Group and RAAF stated that the RAAF public information office "was kept quite busy . . . answering inquiries on the 'flying disc,' which was reported to be in [the] possession of the 509th Bomb Group. The object turned out to be a radar tracking balloon." By his signature, the RAAF's commanding officer certified that the report represented a complete and accurate account of RAAF activities in July 1947. (Excerpts from the report are contained in app. I.)
In addition to unit history reports, we also searched for other government records on the Roswell crash. In this regard, the Chief Archivist for the National Personnel Records Center provided us with documentation indicating that (1) RAAF records such as finance and accounting, supplies, buildings and grounds, and other general administrative matters from March 1945 through December 1949 and (2) RAAF outgoing messages from October 1946 through December 1949 were destroyed. According to this official, the document disposition form did not properly indicate the authority under which the disposal action was taken. The Center's Chief Archivist stated that from his personal experience, many of the Air Force organizational records covering this time period were destroyed without entering a citation for the governing disposition authority. Our review of records control forms showing the destruction of other records--including outgoing RAAF messages for 1950--supports the Chief Archivist's viewpoint.
In searching for government records on the Roswell crash, we were particularly interested in identifying and reviewing records of military units assigned to RAAF in 1947--to include the 509th Bomb Group, the 1st Air Transport Unit, the 427th Army Air Force Base Unit, and the 1395th Military Police Company (Aviation).
Document disposition forms obtained from the National Personnel Records Center in St. Louis, Missouri, indicate that in 1953, the Walker Air Force Base (formerly RAAF) records officer transferred to the Army's Kansas City records depository the histories of units stationed at Walker Air Force Base. These histories included the 509th Bomb Group and RAAF for February 1947 through October 1947; the 1st Air Transport Unit for July 1946 through June 1947; and the 427th Army Air Force Base Unit for January 1946 to February 1947. We could not locate any documentation indicating that records of the 1395th Military Police Company (Aviation) were ever retired to the National Personnel Records Center or its predecessor depositories.
The July 1947 history for the 509th Bomb Group and RAAF stated that the RAAF public information office "was kept quite busy . . . answering inquiries on the 'flying disc,' which was reported to be in [the] possession of the 509th Bomb Group. The object turned out to be a radar tracking balloon." By his signature, the RAAF's commanding officer certified that the report represented a complete and accurate account of RAAF activities in July 1947. (Excerpts from the report are contained in app. I.)
In addition to unit history reports, we also searched for other government records on the Roswell crash. In this regard, the Chief Archivist for the National Personnel Records Center provided us with documentation indicating that (1) RAAF records such as finance and accounting, supplies, buildings and grounds, and other general administrative matters from March 1945 through December 1949 and (2) RAAF outgoing messages from October 1946 through December 1949 were destroyed. According to this official, the document disposition form did not properly indicate the authority under which the disposal action was taken. The Center's Chief Archivist stated that from his personal experience, many of the Air Force organizational records covering this time period were destroyed without entering a citation for the governing disposition authority. Our review of records control forms showing the destruction of other records--including outgoing RAAF messages for 1950--supports the Chief Archivist's viewpoint.
Sunday, August 2, 2009
United States 4.uni.0002 Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire
OUTLINE OF PART B*
Japanese Intelligence in Diplomatic Messages
(a) Reports from the United States
(b) Reports from the Panama Canal
(c) Reports from the Philippine Islands
(d) Reports from the Hawaiian Islands
(e) Reports from South America
(f) Reports from Capetown, South Africa
(g) Reports from Vladivostok, Russia
PART B—JAPANESE INTELLIGENCE IN DIPLOMATIC MESSAGES
Continuing to use diplomatic channels for the transmission of intelligence concerning American merchant ships and men-of-war during the period from August 16, 1941 to October 17, 1941, Japanese officials in Tokyo received an increasing number of such dispatches from the United States and South America, the Philippines and Hawaiian Islands.
(a) Reports from the United States
133. Japan Learns that American Oil Is Being Transported to Russia
Consul Kenji Nakauchi in Hollywood, California reported on August 16, 1941 that the St. Claire, after loading 95,000 barrels of aviation gasoline, had sailed from Los Angeles for Vladivostok, and was scheduled to rendezvous at some point in the Pacific with the Fitzsimmons and three other American vessels, all carrying similar cargo. According to rumor, a number of United States destroyers on maneuvers were also bound for Vladivostok,[514] and a Japanese spy in Seattle reported that the English warship, Warspite, had entered the port of Bremerton about August 13 or 14, 1941.[515]
It was disclosed on August 21, 1941 that the Russian ship, Vladimar Mayskovsky, had arrived at Seattle, and after being repaired, would move to California to load freight for Vladivostok. The Minsk was reported to have left Seattle harbor, although its destination was unknown, and the Patrovsuky was still in dry dock.[516]
On the same day Tokyo informed Berlin that though America was apparently transporting oil to Russia, using American, Russian, and neutral ships, and there was a possibility that several hundred planes had already been transported, up to the present time not one American vessel had entered the port of Vladivostok. Although both the Russian Ambassador in Tokyo and the American government, through Ambassador Nomura, had been warned by Japan concerning the extension of a third power's military movements to East Asia, Japan believed that it was impossible to effect any actual restraint through such steps.[517]
*See TABLE OF CONTENTS for a detailed listing of topics discussed in Part B.
[514] III, 285.
[515] III, 286.
[516] III, 287.
[517] III, 288.
[122]
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
Consul Yoshio Muto in San Francisco on August 26, 1941 advised Tokyo that the Russian freighter, Yakut, had left port August 24, 1941 loaded with gasoline, shoes, socks, and small arms. Confirming the arrival at San Francisco of the Russian freighter Minsk the report also listed the Russian tanker Dombas as having arrived in port from Los Angeles.[518]
134. Japan Learns of Shipment of American Planes To Russia
Consul Jiseburo Sato, Japanese Intelligence agent at Seattle, reported on August 18, 1941 that a group of large planes was being sent from the United States to Alaska, and planes already in Alaska were probably destined to supply Soviet Russia. Since several two-motored medium sized planes en route to Alaska were marked with the insignia of the United States Army, he surmised that they were probably not intended to be sent to Russia.[519]
135. American Aid to Russia Is Viewed as Threat to Japan
Japan, considerably concerned over these reports of American aid to Russia, learned from Rome that the United States had recently made representations to the Russian government to permit the sending of American naval advisers to Vladivostok. Since American military establishments in Russia would be a threat against Japan, the Japanese Ambassador in Rome advised his government to make a thorough investigation to ensure that they were not established, although the Russian authorities had apparently not yet permitted nor would permit such action.[520]
The Japanese Foreign Minister informed Ambassador Nomura on August 28, 1941 that he had directed the Japanese Ambassador in Moscow to warn Russia that should supplies be exported from the United States to Russia through Japanese waters, Japan's position would become extremely delicate. Foreign Minister Toyoda remarked that, according to recent intelligence, seven American, Russian, and neutral ships were transporting airplane gasoline for the aid of Russia. The Russian government was urged by Japan to consider this development with extreme caution, not only from the legal viewpoint of international law but from the standpoint of the general world situation.[521]
To prevent the spreading of the European war into the Far East, Russia was urged to consider the Japanese-Russian agreement and the maintenance of the excellent relationship between the two countries. In the event that the United States sent its ships through Japanese waters, the effect upon public opinion within Japan, as well as the reactions of Germany and Italy, would "indeed be terrible in the extreme". With regard to the importation of American goods, Japan insisted that Russia give particular attention to the routes over which imports were received.[522]
Meanwhile, Japanese officials on the west coast of the United States continued their intelligence reports on the movements of American shipping. In addition to the departure on September 8, 1941 for Vladivostok of a vessel bearing 80,000 barrels of aviation gasoline, Consul Yoshio Muto in San Francisco also notified Japan that four American tankers of the General Petroleum Company were to be dispatched on the direct shipping route to Vladivostok.[523]
[518] III, 289.
[519] III, 290.
[520] III, 291.
[521] III, 292.
[522] III, 293.
[523] III, 294.
[123]
136. Japan Attempts to Expand Its Naval Intelligence Activities
On September 2, 1941 it became apparent to Tokyo that the expansion of Japanese naval intelligence activities in both North and South America was necessary. Based on a request from naval authorities in Japan, Ambassador Nomura was to insist that a member of his staff go to Hawaii in the capacity of a courier, though in the light of Japanese-American relations the selection of an opportune moment for the presentation of this request to the American government was left to his discretion.[524]
Ambassador Nomura replied that inasmuch as Courier Kuga was returning to Japan by way of the United States, having booked passage on the President Taylor sailing from San Francisco on September 6, 1941, the dispatching of a courier to Hawaii was no longer necessary.[525]
137. Japanese Agents Note American Army and Air Group Activities
Through Consul Sato at Seattle, the statements made by the president of the Boeing Company to a Senate investigating committee were relayed to Tokyo on September 4, 1941. According to the report, the lack of progress was because of the changes in design and the unprecedented expansion of the plant. Although the production of American Army planes was four months behind in schedule, it was expected that this would be caught up by the end of the year.[526]
Furthermore, Lt. General DeWitt, 4th Army Commander, had announced that his army would be increased from 90,000 to 120,000 men. Barracks capable of accommodating 30,000 men were being constructed along the coast, and a mechanized division of 10,000 men was to be located at Santa Maria. The locations of newly organized divisions were listed as Meadow-ford, West Yellowston, Fort Huachuca and Marysville.[527]
Reported also in an intelligence dispatch of September 4, 1941 was the movement on August 23 of the 39th Bombardment Group, the 89th Observation Squadron, and the 310th Signal Company from Spokane to Louisiana to take part in the September maneuvers. The 54th Bombardment Group would receive either Republics or twin-motored Lockheed planes.[528]
138. Japan Watches the Activities of a Russian Military Commission in the United States
Reporting to Japanese intelligence headquarters in Washington, Consul (Lt. Comdr.) Jisaburo Sato at Seattle wired that two Russian planes, arriving at the Naval airfield at Sand Point on September 4, 1941, had brought members of a Russian commission to confer with American authorities concerning aid to Russia.[529] This was apparently the Russian Military Commission which on September 2, 1941 had inspected the B-19 heavy bombers at March Field, and on September 3, 1941 had visited various airplane factories at Los Angeles.[530]
Ambassador Nomura requested Japanese agents in San Francisco, Los Angeles, and Seattle to investigate the possibility of the Russian Military Commission's flying American planes to Russia. He also asked that intelligence be secured concerning the eventual transfer of a considerable American bombing force to the Siberian area.[531]
[524] III, 295.
[525] III, 296.
[526] III, 297.
[527] Ibid.
[528] III, 298.
[529] III, 299.
[530] III, 300.
[531] III, 301.
[124]
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
In accordance with Ambassador Nomura's request to report concerning the Russian Military Commission, Consul Sato informed Tokyo on September 22, 1941 that two Russian hydroplanes, bearing ten members of the commission, had left for Moscow on September 19, 1941, but that the remaining thirty-seven members were to stay in the United States to study the production of airplanes.[532] Nineteen of the thirty-seven members remaining in the United States were receiving training in bomber operations at Spokane, Washington, while the others were staying in Washington and Los Angeles.[533]
139. Japanese Consuls Report on West Coast Shipping
Illustrating the close surveillance of American, Russian, and neutral ships by Japanese agents on the American west coast, Consul Muto, on September 8, 1941, informed Tokyo that the Russian freighter, the Minsk, loaded with 8,000 drums of aviation oil, airplane engines, machine guns, ammunition, snow plows and other articles had sailed from San Francisco on September 6, 1941.[534]
On September 6, 1941 Japanese officials in Seattle, attempting to verify the presence of the Vladimar Maykoysky and the Deabrint noted that four vessels were in port.[535] In a dispatch transmitted September 18, 1941 the Japanese Consul reported that the Russian freighter Mijinski, from Vladivostok, had entered San Francisco on September 17, 1941 and that the American tanker, St. Claire, returning from Vladivostok, was expected to arrive on September 19, 1941[536]
Although Consul Muto in San Francisco reported on September 18, 1941 that the Warspite had entered port there from Bremerton,[537] on September 20, 1941 Consul Sato in Seattle informed Tokyo that repair work was continuing on the Warspite at Bremerton. One Saratoga-class aircraft carrier and another vessel which appeared to be a cruiser were also in port, but a ship of the New Mexico class, previously reported there had departed.[538] The arrival of one Oklahoma-class battleship at San Francisco was announced by Consul Muto at San Francisco on October 2, 1941, and a report that the Hunters Point shipyard would be taken over by the United States Navy was sent to Japanese officials in Washington.[539]
On October 16, 1941 Consul Muto declared that the Russian freighter Mijinski was docking, that the Igarka was three days out of New York, that the Nantes was seven days from Vladivostok, and the Michulin was ten or twelve days from Vladivostok. The Nantes was loaded with wheat, 20,000 barrels of fuel oil, and machine guns and tanks.[540] The Russian ship, Kiev, equipped with a 500-watt radio for the reception of orders and war news from Moscow, was reported, on October 12, 1941, to be loading raw materials at Los Angeles before proceeding to Vladivostok.[541]
[532] III, 302.
[533] III, 303.
[534] III, 304-305.
[535] III, 306.
[536] III, 307.
[537] III, 308.
[538] III, 309.
[539] III, 310.
[540] III, 311.
[541] III, 312.
[125]
140. Foreign Minister Toyoda Sends New Instructions Concerning Naval Intelligence Reports Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire
To facilitate the making of reports on the movements of American warships, Foreign Minister Teijiro Toyoda on October 16, 1941 directed the Japanese Consul in Seattle to make routine reports once every ten days, in case there were no great changes in the movements and basing of warships. Special reports were to be made immediately on such occasions as (a) the arrival or departure of American flagships of fleet or scouting force; (b) the arrival or departure of more than ten vessels of any type; (c) the arrival or departure of warships of other countries than the United States; and (d) the inauguration of patrolling by naval planes.[542]
(b) Reports from the Panama Canal
141. Japan Fails to Learn Destination of Planes Departing from Panama
One hundred planes, including Douglas B-18's Martin B-17A bombers, and Boeing 24's which had been stationed at Albrook Field, suddenly departed in early August, 1941 before Japanese observers could learn their destination. A hearsay report was sent to Tokyo on August 18, 1941 that approximately 35 or 45 two-motored bombing planes were stationed at the newly constructed Agua Dulce Air Field in the province of Cocli.[543]
Ships moving through the Panama Canal were the subject of Japanese naval intelligence reports forwarded to Tokyo by Minister Akiyama. Four American submarines, on August 18, 1941, and two freighters, on August 17, 1941, had passed through the Canal toward the Atlantic.
Moving toward the Pacific on August 15, 1941 were a United States freighter and the Triomphant, a DeGaullist destroyer, which left for Tehita on August 17. In addition, five destroyers were reported taking on fuel, rations, and other supplies at Panama.[544] One British and two American freighters were observed on August 19, 1941 to be moving through the Canal toward the Pacific.[545]
Between September 17 and 21, 1941, one American tanker and four American freighters had reportedly passed through the Canal bound for the Pacific, while two American tankers, four American freighters, and one English freighter had gone toward the Atlantic.[546] Informing Tokyo on September 28, 1941 that a Diomede class vessel recently had the upper section of the mast cut off, Minister Akiyama announced that the British operated two ships of this type.[547] On September 30, 1941 it was reported that two warships, possibly French, had left port on August 29, 1941 bound for the Pacific, while another ship of the Omaha class had also departed for an unknown destination.[548]
Minister Akiyama wired on October 2, 1941 that between September 30 and October 2, 1941 three American freighters and one English hospital ship had passed through the Canal to the Pacific, and nine American freighters and one American liner to the Atlantic.[549]
Reporting that one vessel, three American freighters, and one French steamer had moved into the Pacific between October 3 and 4, 1941, Mr. Akiyama wired that seven American freighters, the Union tanker, one destroyer, and two British freighters had gone through the Canal successively in the direction of the Atlantic. Since two cruisers had accompanied these vessels as far as Balboa, indications were that their cargoes were made up of military supplies.[550]
[542] III, 313.
[543] III, 314.
[544] III, 315.
[545] III, 316.
[546] III, 317.
[547] III, 318.
[548] III, 319.
[549] III, 320.
[550] III, 321.
[126]
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
142. Japanese Reports on Panama Military Installations
Intelligence transmitted to Tokyo on October 2, 1941 concerned the transfer of the Panama Air Depot from France Field to Curundu Heights, which had been made because of the recent concentration of military aviation in the Pacific area. Tokyo learned of an announcement which had been made on August 1, 1941 by Rear Admiral Sadler, Commander of the 13th Naval District, that a new warehouse on Pier 18, the ammunition unloading pier, and the Balboa dry dock would be taken over for use as naval warehouses.
The acquisition and camouflaging by the United States Navy of petroleum supply tanks at Boca on the Pacific side and at Mt. Hope on the Atlantic side were reported, as well as the construction at Corozal of a storage depot which would contain foodstuffs to supply the Canal Zone for six months should shipping routes between Panama and the United States be severed.[551]
An investigation by the Japanese Minister at Panama disclosed, on October 6, 1941, the sites of five United States' airplane bases in Panama. Panamanian airports, already constructed and scheduled to be converted into military establishments, were identified as the ones at David, in Chiriqui province, and Paidonya outside Panama City. Several other locations had been surveyed but were not used because of the poor condition of the terrain.[552] Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire
(c) Reports from the Philippine Islands
During the period from August 7 to October 17, 1941, Japanese naval intelligence reports from the Philippine Islands increased in number. They were concerned principally with fortifications, the arrival and departure of warships, and the construction of airports.
143. Japan Attempts to Identify British Vessels Reported at Manila
On August 9, 1941 Tokyo directed that secret investigations be made regarding the name of the British battleship reported to have entered port at Manila on August 17, 1941, sailing on the next day for the west coast of North America. According to the Japanese, this ship was reported to be the Warspite, although it was pointed out that the British cruiser Leander resembled the Warspite from a distance.[553]
Consul Katsumi Nihro, in replying to the inquiry, was uncertain as to the ship's identity, and said that he knew only that it was a light cruiser of the Leander class. No British ships, he added, had entered port recently except one which he had mentioned previously.[554]
On August 16, 1941 six ships were reported to have arrived in Manila on the previous day, and it was observed that both United States Army and Navy airplanes were being painted dark blue.[555]
144. Tokyo Inquires About a Floating Dry Dock Near Mariveles
The disappearance of a floating dock previously seen in the vicinity of Mariveles, Luzon was being investigated by the Japanese on August 18, 1941,[556] but subsequent investigations revealed that as late as September 4, 1941 the floating dock was still located one mile southeast of Mariveles in Bataan province. Barracks were being constructed near Mariberosu, and in spite of a previous rumor that they were built for the purpose of imprisoning Japanese nationals, Consul Nihro said that they were intended to house technicians and personnel working on the floating dock.[557]
[551] III, 322.
[552] III, 323.
[553] III, 324.
[554] III, 325.
[555] III, 326.
[556] III, 327-328.
[557] III, 329.
[127]
145. Japanese Reports on Manila Anti-Aircraft Preparations
As to fortifications in Manila proper, the Japanese Consul thought that, since admittance to the upper stories of the city's tall buildings had been forbidden, it was fairly certain that anti-aircraft guns had been placed on the tops of two of Manila's leading hotels, on the Insular Life and Trading Commerce buildings, and on several other public buildings. The transportation of thirty-six anti-aircraft guns to Camp Murphy had also been noted during the latter part of July 1941.[558]
146. Japanese Report on American Airport Construction
Tokyo was informed on August 20, 1941 that work begun in March on an unidentified airplane base in the Philippines, which had been suspended for a time, was now being accelerated.[559] Since too much time would be required to fill in paddy fields for the site of another new air base at Davao. Consul Jitaro Kihara disclosed that plans had been changed, and the airfield would be constructed between the sea and paddy fields where a cocoanut grove stood. Four concrete runways were to be built, and 2,500 recruits from the local populace were to be used in the construction.[560]
147. Japan Inquires Concerning the U.S.S. Houston
Learning from Japanese naval authorities that the Houston had disappeared after passing through the harbor entrance on August 20, 1941, Foreign Minister Toyoda asked on August 30, 1941 that Japanese agents investigate the waters in and around Manila for a trace of this warship.[561] He also directed that weekly intelligence reports be sent to Tokyo. The arrivals and departures of more than five or six destroyers, submarines, or naval ships other than American, were to be subjects of special reports at the time such changes occurred.[562]
On September 1, 1941 Consul Katsumi Nihro informed Japanese officials that the Houston had arrived at Manila on August 5, and that after loading food supplies, it had departed on August 7, 1941. It was surmised that since Admiral Thomas Charles Hart had attended the ceremonies connected with the launching of the "Q" boat for the Philippine army on August 10, the ship must have been in the vicinity until that date. Its course from then on, however, was not known.[563]
The Houston, with two destroyers, re-entered port at Manila on September 7, 1941,[564] and after loading fuel and stores it departed for an unknown destination on September 11, accompanied by two submarines and two destroyers.[565]
148. Japanese Report on American Ship Movements In the Philippines
A number of American destroyers, reported without substantiation to have come from Hawaii, entered the harbor of Jolo during the middle of July. During the last ten days of July, six other American destroyers entered ports in the Philippines and engaged in target practice with live ammunition. One large airplane capable of carrying twenty-six persons had landed on the water in the vicinity of Jolo for a number of hours, and 2,000 drums of airplane gasoline were stored within the military establishment at Jolo.[566]
[558] III, 330.
[559] III, 331.
[560] III, 332.
[561] III, 333.
[562] III, 334.
[563] III, 335.
[564] III, 336.
[565] III, 337.
[566] III, 338.
[128]
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
On August 23, 1941 Manila reported that six transports, as well as the Hon and Pisu were in port at Manila, and that one destroyer and the Gorudostna were at Cavite. It was also announced at this time that the oiler Torinircic hadLouis J. Sheehan, Esquire departed for Tarakan on August 22, 1941 to take on oil, that several destroyers and submarines were stationed in the vicinity of Mariveles and that Brigadier General Cragette, arriving on August 20 on the Dutch ship, Tibadaeky, had conferred with General Douglas McArthur on August 21, 1941. The Chanto had arrived at Manila on August 20 from Olongapu, where her sister ship, the Kabarunda, was still undergoing repairs. Another ship, possibly the Maddo, and two destroyers had arrived at Cebu on August 16, 1941, and had left the same night.[567]
On August 30, 1941, one destroyer was at Corundusu, and three destroyers, six submarines, and the tanker, Trinity, were at Manila where the arrival of 500 American soldiers on the Cleveland and the entrance of the Migak, a vessel which the Japanese understood was loaded to capacity with military equipment, were noted on the preceding day.[568] The Marblehead returned to its post on August 31, and two destroyers departed September 1, 1944.[569]
A ship, possibly the Black Hawk, the Beru, two destroyers, and one submarine were in port at Manila on September 13, 1941, according to a Japanese intelligence report, and on the same day there arrived an American cruiser of the Brooklyn class, believed to have come from Hawaii.[570] Whether Legaspi Island was being used as a port of call by an American aviation company was the subject of an inquiry directed by Tokyo to Manila on September 15, 1941,[571] Accordingly, Minister Nihro reported the next day that Legaspi was being used as an intermediary station by the Philippine Aerial Taxi Company between Manila and Cebu. It was also noted that the Pan-American Airways were planning to build a landing place at Tacloban in Leyte Province, but as yet had not realized this plan.[572]
The St. Louis, with three other unidentified vessels had left the harbor for Singapore early on September 16, 1941 apparently loaded with food supplies.[573] Since red flags had been hoisted, it was indicated that ammunition was being handled on these ships.[574]
In an intelligence dispatch from Manila on September 20, 1941 Consul Nihro declared that the Phoenix and one other ship were anchored at that port. Another ship, probably the Peters, which entered the harbor on September 18, was reported to have carried 500 soldiers.[575]
On September 26, 1941 Consul Kihara at Davao pointed out that since August, 1941 American destroyer tenders, destroyers, and submarines had entered the port of Davao from the South Seas on every Saturday and had left after about two days. From members of the crews of these warships, he had learned that the warships traversed a route touching Jolo Island, Bataan, Tarao in British North Borneo, and Tarakan, a city in Netherlands Borneo.[576]
[567] III, 339.
[568] III, 340.
[569] III, 341.
[570] III, 342.
[571] III, 343.
[572] III, 344.
[573] III, 345.
[574] III, 346.
[575] III, 347.
[576] III, 348.
[129]
Information concerning the size, tonnage and plane accommodations of the Langley was sent from Davao to Tokyo on September 26, 1941.[577] Consul Nihro advised on October 3, 1941 that he had learned that the American cruisers, the St. Louis and Phoenix, sailing from Manila on September 16 and 22, 1941 respectively, were headed for Singapore. He requested information from Singapore concerning this in order to check on the accuracy of his spy reports.[578] In return it was reported from Shanghai that the United States Army transport, the Henderson, had left that port for Manila carrying 150 Marines.[579]
On October 4, 1941 Foreign Minister Toyoda directed the Japanese Consul at Manila to make a reconnaissance of the new defense works along the east, west and southern coasts of Luzon. The consul was also asked to report on their progress, strength and anything else which might be of interest to Japan.[580]
The Japanese Consul reported that on the afternoon of October 13, 1941 the Houston, Marblehead, and one other vessel, five destroyers, and two minelayers had departed, but that their destinations were unknown. In the harbor on October 14, 1941 were the Black Hawk, four destroyers, ten submarines, the Gold Star, and one other vessel.[581]
A routine intelligence transmission sent to Tokyo on October 17, 1941 reported the Ton, the Maddo, the Hon, four destroyers, five submarines, one minelayer, the Beru and the oiler, Trinity, in port at that time. It was added that large scale barracks were being constructed about 131 kilometers from Manila between Cabanatuan and Laur, and that mechanized maneuvers were taking place between Laur and Aguilla.[582]
(d) Reports from the Hawaiian Islands
149. Japan Notes Activities of French in the Pacific
Consul Nagao Kita reported that taking passage on a destroyer which had left port on September 16, 1941 were Captain C. I. Gargenlieu, high commissioner for Pacific territories under the De Gaulle regime, and Commander G. Cabanier, French Commander of Defense, who were to assume new responsibilities in New Caledonia.[583]
150. Japanese Foreign Minister Requests Special Intelligence Reports Concerning Pearl Harbor
Japanese naval intelligence reports from Honolulu, though few in number, were in the light of the later attack on Pearl Harbor to grow increasingly significant as December 7, 1941 drew nearer. The significance becomes apparent, however, only when reading history backwards.
Concerning Pearl Harbor, Foreign Minister Toyoda on September 24, 1941 directed that in future intelligence reports from Hawaii, Pearl Harbor waters were to be divided roughly into five subareas—
Area A: Waters between Ford Island and the Arsenal.
Area B: Waters adjacent to the Island south and west of Ford Island. (This area is on the opposite side of the Island from Area A.)
Area C: East Loch.
Area D: Middle Loch.
Area E: West Loch and the communicating water routes
[577] III, 349.
[578] III, 350.
[579] III, 351.
[580] III, 352.
[581] III, 353.
[582] III, 354.
[583] III, 355.
Japanese Intelligence in Diplomatic Messages
(a) Reports from the United States
(b) Reports from the Panama Canal
(c) Reports from the Philippine Islands
(d) Reports from the Hawaiian Islands
(e) Reports from South America
(f) Reports from Capetown, South Africa
(g) Reports from Vladivostok, Russia
PART B—JAPANESE INTELLIGENCE IN DIPLOMATIC MESSAGES
Continuing to use diplomatic channels for the transmission of intelligence concerning American merchant ships and men-of-war during the period from August 16, 1941 to October 17, 1941, Japanese officials in Tokyo received an increasing number of such dispatches from the United States and South America, the Philippines and Hawaiian Islands.
(a) Reports from the United States
133. Japan Learns that American Oil Is Being Transported to Russia
Consul Kenji Nakauchi in Hollywood, California reported on August 16, 1941 that the St. Claire, after loading 95,000 barrels of aviation gasoline, had sailed from Los Angeles for Vladivostok, and was scheduled to rendezvous at some point in the Pacific with the Fitzsimmons and three other American vessels, all carrying similar cargo. According to rumor, a number of United States destroyers on maneuvers were also bound for Vladivostok,[514] and a Japanese spy in Seattle reported that the English warship, Warspite, had entered the port of Bremerton about August 13 or 14, 1941.[515]
It was disclosed on August 21, 1941 that the Russian ship, Vladimar Mayskovsky, had arrived at Seattle, and after being repaired, would move to California to load freight for Vladivostok. The Minsk was reported to have left Seattle harbor, although its destination was unknown, and the Patrovsuky was still in dry dock.[516]
On the same day Tokyo informed Berlin that though America was apparently transporting oil to Russia, using American, Russian, and neutral ships, and there was a possibility that several hundred planes had already been transported, up to the present time not one American vessel had entered the port of Vladivostok. Although both the Russian Ambassador in Tokyo and the American government, through Ambassador Nomura, had been warned by Japan concerning the extension of a third power's military movements to East Asia, Japan believed that it was impossible to effect any actual restraint through such steps.[517]
*See TABLE OF CONTENTS for a detailed listing of topics discussed in Part B.
[514] III, 285.
[515] III, 286.
[516] III, 287.
[517] III, 288.
[122]
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
Consul Yoshio Muto in San Francisco on August 26, 1941 advised Tokyo that the Russian freighter, Yakut, had left port August 24, 1941 loaded with gasoline, shoes, socks, and small arms. Confirming the arrival at San Francisco of the Russian freighter Minsk the report also listed the Russian tanker Dombas as having arrived in port from Los Angeles.[518]
134. Japan Learns of Shipment of American Planes To Russia
Consul Jiseburo Sato, Japanese Intelligence agent at Seattle, reported on August 18, 1941 that a group of large planes was being sent from the United States to Alaska, and planes already in Alaska were probably destined to supply Soviet Russia. Since several two-motored medium sized planes en route to Alaska were marked with the insignia of the United States Army, he surmised that they were probably not intended to be sent to Russia.[519]
135. American Aid to Russia Is Viewed as Threat to Japan
Japan, considerably concerned over these reports of American aid to Russia, learned from Rome that the United States had recently made representations to the Russian government to permit the sending of American naval advisers to Vladivostok. Since American military establishments in Russia would be a threat against Japan, the Japanese Ambassador in Rome advised his government to make a thorough investigation to ensure that they were not established, although the Russian authorities had apparently not yet permitted nor would permit such action.[520]
The Japanese Foreign Minister informed Ambassador Nomura on August 28, 1941 that he had directed the Japanese Ambassador in Moscow to warn Russia that should supplies be exported from the United States to Russia through Japanese waters, Japan's position would become extremely delicate. Foreign Minister Toyoda remarked that, according to recent intelligence, seven American, Russian, and neutral ships were transporting airplane gasoline for the aid of Russia. The Russian government was urged by Japan to consider this development with extreme caution, not only from the legal viewpoint of international law but from the standpoint of the general world situation.[521]
To prevent the spreading of the European war into the Far East, Russia was urged to consider the Japanese-Russian agreement and the maintenance of the excellent relationship between the two countries. In the event that the United States sent its ships through Japanese waters, the effect upon public opinion within Japan, as well as the reactions of Germany and Italy, would "indeed be terrible in the extreme". With regard to the importation of American goods, Japan insisted that Russia give particular attention to the routes over which imports were received.[522]
Meanwhile, Japanese officials on the west coast of the United States continued their intelligence reports on the movements of American shipping. In addition to the departure on September 8, 1941 for Vladivostok of a vessel bearing 80,000 barrels of aviation gasoline, Consul Yoshio Muto in San Francisco also notified Japan that four American tankers of the General Petroleum Company were to be dispatched on the direct shipping route to Vladivostok.[523]
[518] III, 289.
[519] III, 290.
[520] III, 291.
[521] III, 292.
[522] III, 293.
[523] III, 294.
[123]
136. Japan Attempts to Expand Its Naval Intelligence Activities
On September 2, 1941 it became apparent to Tokyo that the expansion of Japanese naval intelligence activities in both North and South America was necessary. Based on a request from naval authorities in Japan, Ambassador Nomura was to insist that a member of his staff go to Hawaii in the capacity of a courier, though in the light of Japanese-American relations the selection of an opportune moment for the presentation of this request to the American government was left to his discretion.[524]
Ambassador Nomura replied that inasmuch as Courier Kuga was returning to Japan by way of the United States, having booked passage on the President Taylor sailing from San Francisco on September 6, 1941, the dispatching of a courier to Hawaii was no longer necessary.[525]
137. Japanese Agents Note American Army and Air Group Activities
Through Consul Sato at Seattle, the statements made by the president of the Boeing Company to a Senate investigating committee were relayed to Tokyo on September 4, 1941. According to the report, the lack of progress was because of the changes in design and the unprecedented expansion of the plant. Although the production of American Army planes was four months behind in schedule, it was expected that this would be caught up by the end of the year.[526]
Furthermore, Lt. General DeWitt, 4th Army Commander, had announced that his army would be increased from 90,000 to 120,000 men. Barracks capable of accommodating 30,000 men were being constructed along the coast, and a mechanized division of 10,000 men was to be located at Santa Maria. The locations of newly organized divisions were listed as Meadow-ford, West Yellowston, Fort Huachuca and Marysville.[527]
Reported also in an intelligence dispatch of September 4, 1941 was the movement on August 23 of the 39th Bombardment Group, the 89th Observation Squadron, and the 310th Signal Company from Spokane to Louisiana to take part in the September maneuvers. The 54th Bombardment Group would receive either Republics or twin-motored Lockheed planes.[528]
138. Japan Watches the Activities of a Russian Military Commission in the United States
Reporting to Japanese intelligence headquarters in Washington, Consul (Lt. Comdr.) Jisaburo Sato at Seattle wired that two Russian planes, arriving at the Naval airfield at Sand Point on September 4, 1941, had brought members of a Russian commission to confer with American authorities concerning aid to Russia.[529] This was apparently the Russian Military Commission which on September 2, 1941 had inspected the B-19 heavy bombers at March Field, and on September 3, 1941 had visited various airplane factories at Los Angeles.[530]
Ambassador Nomura requested Japanese agents in San Francisco, Los Angeles, and Seattle to investigate the possibility of the Russian Military Commission's flying American planes to Russia. He also asked that intelligence be secured concerning the eventual transfer of a considerable American bombing force to the Siberian area.[531]
[524] III, 295.
[525] III, 296.
[526] III, 297.
[527] Ibid.
[528] III, 298.
[529] III, 299.
[530] III, 300.
[531] III, 301.
[124]
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
In accordance with Ambassador Nomura's request to report concerning the Russian Military Commission, Consul Sato informed Tokyo on September 22, 1941 that two Russian hydroplanes, bearing ten members of the commission, had left for Moscow on September 19, 1941, but that the remaining thirty-seven members were to stay in the United States to study the production of airplanes.[532] Nineteen of the thirty-seven members remaining in the United States were receiving training in bomber operations at Spokane, Washington, while the others were staying in Washington and Los Angeles.[533]
139. Japanese Consuls Report on West Coast Shipping
Illustrating the close surveillance of American, Russian, and neutral ships by Japanese agents on the American west coast, Consul Muto, on September 8, 1941, informed Tokyo that the Russian freighter, the Minsk, loaded with 8,000 drums of aviation oil, airplane engines, machine guns, ammunition, snow plows and other articles had sailed from San Francisco on September 6, 1941.[534]
On September 6, 1941 Japanese officials in Seattle, attempting to verify the presence of the Vladimar Maykoysky and the Deabrint noted that four vessels were in port.[535] In a dispatch transmitted September 18, 1941 the Japanese Consul reported that the Russian freighter Mijinski, from Vladivostok, had entered San Francisco on September 17, 1941 and that the American tanker, St. Claire, returning from Vladivostok, was expected to arrive on September 19, 1941[536]
Although Consul Muto in San Francisco reported on September 18, 1941 that the Warspite had entered port there from Bremerton,[537] on September 20, 1941 Consul Sato in Seattle informed Tokyo that repair work was continuing on the Warspite at Bremerton. One Saratoga-class aircraft carrier and another vessel which appeared to be a cruiser were also in port, but a ship of the New Mexico class, previously reported there had departed.[538] The arrival of one Oklahoma-class battleship at San Francisco was announced by Consul Muto at San Francisco on October 2, 1941, and a report that the Hunters Point shipyard would be taken over by the United States Navy was sent to Japanese officials in Washington.[539]
On October 16, 1941 Consul Muto declared that the Russian freighter Mijinski was docking, that the Igarka was three days out of New York, that the Nantes was seven days from Vladivostok, and the Michulin was ten or twelve days from Vladivostok. The Nantes was loaded with wheat, 20,000 barrels of fuel oil, and machine guns and tanks.[540] The Russian ship, Kiev, equipped with a 500-watt radio for the reception of orders and war news from Moscow, was reported, on October 12, 1941, to be loading raw materials at Los Angeles before proceeding to Vladivostok.[541]
[532] III, 302.
[533] III, 303.
[534] III, 304-305.
[535] III, 306.
[536] III, 307.
[537] III, 308.
[538] III, 309.
[539] III, 310.
[540] III, 311.
[541] III, 312.
[125]
140. Foreign Minister Toyoda Sends New Instructions Concerning Naval Intelligence Reports Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire
To facilitate the making of reports on the movements of American warships, Foreign Minister Teijiro Toyoda on October 16, 1941 directed the Japanese Consul in Seattle to make routine reports once every ten days, in case there were no great changes in the movements and basing of warships. Special reports were to be made immediately on such occasions as (a) the arrival or departure of American flagships of fleet or scouting force; (b) the arrival or departure of more than ten vessels of any type; (c) the arrival or departure of warships of other countries than the United States; and (d) the inauguration of patrolling by naval planes.[542]
(b) Reports from the Panama Canal
141. Japan Fails to Learn Destination of Planes Departing from Panama
One hundred planes, including Douglas B-18's Martin B-17A bombers, and Boeing 24's which had been stationed at Albrook Field, suddenly departed in early August, 1941 before Japanese observers could learn their destination. A hearsay report was sent to Tokyo on August 18, 1941 that approximately 35 or 45 two-motored bombing planes were stationed at the newly constructed Agua Dulce Air Field in the province of Cocli.[543]
Ships moving through the Panama Canal were the subject of Japanese naval intelligence reports forwarded to Tokyo by Minister Akiyama. Four American submarines, on August 18, 1941, and two freighters, on August 17, 1941, had passed through the Canal toward the Atlantic.
Moving toward the Pacific on August 15, 1941 were a United States freighter and the Triomphant, a DeGaullist destroyer, which left for Tehita on August 17. In addition, five destroyers were reported taking on fuel, rations, and other supplies at Panama.[544] One British and two American freighters were observed on August 19, 1941 to be moving through the Canal toward the Pacific.[545]
Between September 17 and 21, 1941, one American tanker and four American freighters had reportedly passed through the Canal bound for the Pacific, while two American tankers, four American freighters, and one English freighter had gone toward the Atlantic.[546] Informing Tokyo on September 28, 1941 that a Diomede class vessel recently had the upper section of the mast cut off, Minister Akiyama announced that the British operated two ships of this type.[547] On September 30, 1941 it was reported that two warships, possibly French, had left port on August 29, 1941 bound for the Pacific, while another ship of the Omaha class had also departed for an unknown destination.[548]
Minister Akiyama wired on October 2, 1941 that between September 30 and October 2, 1941 three American freighters and one English hospital ship had passed through the Canal to the Pacific, and nine American freighters and one American liner to the Atlantic.[549]
Reporting that one vessel, three American freighters, and one French steamer had moved into the Pacific between October 3 and 4, 1941, Mr. Akiyama wired that seven American freighters, the Union tanker, one destroyer, and two British freighters had gone through the Canal successively in the direction of the Atlantic. Since two cruisers had accompanied these vessels as far as Balboa, indications were that their cargoes were made up of military supplies.[550]
[542] III, 313.
[543] III, 314.
[544] III, 315.
[545] III, 316.
[546] III, 317.
[547] III, 318.
[548] III, 319.
[549] III, 320.
[550] III, 321.
[126]
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
142. Japanese Reports on Panama Military Installations
Intelligence transmitted to Tokyo on October 2, 1941 concerned the transfer of the Panama Air Depot from France Field to Curundu Heights, which had been made because of the recent concentration of military aviation in the Pacific area. Tokyo learned of an announcement which had been made on August 1, 1941 by Rear Admiral Sadler, Commander of the 13th Naval District, that a new warehouse on Pier 18, the ammunition unloading pier, and the Balboa dry dock would be taken over for use as naval warehouses.
The acquisition and camouflaging by the United States Navy of petroleum supply tanks at Boca on the Pacific side and at Mt. Hope on the Atlantic side were reported, as well as the construction at Corozal of a storage depot which would contain foodstuffs to supply the Canal Zone for six months should shipping routes between Panama and the United States be severed.[551]
An investigation by the Japanese Minister at Panama disclosed, on October 6, 1941, the sites of five United States' airplane bases in Panama. Panamanian airports, already constructed and scheduled to be converted into military establishments, were identified as the ones at David, in Chiriqui province, and Paidonya outside Panama City. Several other locations had been surveyed but were not used because of the poor condition of the terrain.[552] Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire
(c) Reports from the Philippine Islands
During the period from August 7 to October 17, 1941, Japanese naval intelligence reports from the Philippine Islands increased in number. They were concerned principally with fortifications, the arrival and departure of warships, and the construction of airports.
143. Japan Attempts to Identify British Vessels Reported at Manila
On August 9, 1941 Tokyo directed that secret investigations be made regarding the name of the British battleship reported to have entered port at Manila on August 17, 1941, sailing on the next day for the west coast of North America. According to the Japanese, this ship was reported to be the Warspite, although it was pointed out that the British cruiser Leander resembled the Warspite from a distance.[553]
Consul Katsumi Nihro, in replying to the inquiry, was uncertain as to the ship's identity, and said that he knew only that it was a light cruiser of the Leander class. No British ships, he added, had entered port recently except one which he had mentioned previously.[554]
On August 16, 1941 six ships were reported to have arrived in Manila on the previous day, and it was observed that both United States Army and Navy airplanes were being painted dark blue.[555]
144. Tokyo Inquires About a Floating Dry Dock Near Mariveles
The disappearance of a floating dock previously seen in the vicinity of Mariveles, Luzon was being investigated by the Japanese on August 18, 1941,[556] but subsequent investigations revealed that as late as September 4, 1941 the floating dock was still located one mile southeast of Mariveles in Bataan province. Barracks were being constructed near Mariberosu, and in spite of a previous rumor that they were built for the purpose of imprisoning Japanese nationals, Consul Nihro said that they were intended to house technicians and personnel working on the floating dock.[557]
[551] III, 322.
[552] III, 323.
[553] III, 324.
[554] III, 325.
[555] III, 326.
[556] III, 327-328.
[557] III, 329.
[127]
145. Japanese Reports on Manila Anti-Aircraft Preparations
As to fortifications in Manila proper, the Japanese Consul thought that, since admittance to the upper stories of the city's tall buildings had been forbidden, it was fairly certain that anti-aircraft guns had been placed on the tops of two of Manila's leading hotels, on the Insular Life and Trading Commerce buildings, and on several other public buildings. The transportation of thirty-six anti-aircraft guns to Camp Murphy had also been noted during the latter part of July 1941.[558]
146. Japanese Report on American Airport Construction
Tokyo was informed on August 20, 1941 that work begun in March on an unidentified airplane base in the Philippines, which had been suspended for a time, was now being accelerated.[559] Since too much time would be required to fill in paddy fields for the site of another new air base at Davao. Consul Jitaro Kihara disclosed that plans had been changed, and the airfield would be constructed between the sea and paddy fields where a cocoanut grove stood. Four concrete runways were to be built, and 2,500 recruits from the local populace were to be used in the construction.[560]
147. Japan Inquires Concerning the U.S.S. Houston
Learning from Japanese naval authorities that the Houston had disappeared after passing through the harbor entrance on August 20, 1941, Foreign Minister Toyoda asked on August 30, 1941 that Japanese agents investigate the waters in and around Manila for a trace of this warship.[561] He also directed that weekly intelligence reports be sent to Tokyo. The arrivals and departures of more than five or six destroyers, submarines, or naval ships other than American, were to be subjects of special reports at the time such changes occurred.[562]
On September 1, 1941 Consul Katsumi Nihro informed Japanese officials that the Houston had arrived at Manila on August 5, and that after loading food supplies, it had departed on August 7, 1941. It was surmised that since Admiral Thomas Charles Hart had attended the ceremonies connected with the launching of the "Q" boat for the Philippine army on August 10, the ship must have been in the vicinity until that date. Its course from then on, however, was not known.[563]
The Houston, with two destroyers, re-entered port at Manila on September 7, 1941,[564] and after loading fuel and stores it departed for an unknown destination on September 11, accompanied by two submarines and two destroyers.[565]
148. Japanese Report on American Ship Movements In the Philippines
A number of American destroyers, reported without substantiation to have come from Hawaii, entered the harbor of Jolo during the middle of July. During the last ten days of July, six other American destroyers entered ports in the Philippines and engaged in target practice with live ammunition. One large airplane capable of carrying twenty-six persons had landed on the water in the vicinity of Jolo for a number of hours, and 2,000 drums of airplane gasoline were stored within the military establishment at Jolo.[566]
[558] III, 330.
[559] III, 331.
[560] III, 332.
[561] III, 333.
[562] III, 334.
[563] III, 335.
[564] III, 336.
[565] III, 337.
[566] III, 338.
[128]
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
On August 23, 1941 Manila reported that six transports, as well as the Hon and Pisu were in port at Manila, and that one destroyer and the Gorudostna were at Cavite. It was also announced at this time that the oiler Torinircic hadLouis J. Sheehan, Esquire departed for Tarakan on August 22, 1941 to take on oil, that several destroyers and submarines were stationed in the vicinity of Mariveles and that Brigadier General Cragette, arriving on August 20 on the Dutch ship, Tibadaeky, had conferred with General Douglas McArthur on August 21, 1941. The Chanto had arrived at Manila on August 20 from Olongapu, where her sister ship, the Kabarunda, was still undergoing repairs. Another ship, possibly the Maddo, and two destroyers had arrived at Cebu on August 16, 1941, and had left the same night.[567]
On August 30, 1941, one destroyer was at Corundusu, and three destroyers, six submarines, and the tanker, Trinity, were at Manila where the arrival of 500 American soldiers on the Cleveland and the entrance of the Migak, a vessel which the Japanese understood was loaded to capacity with military equipment, were noted on the preceding day.[568] The Marblehead returned to its post on August 31, and two destroyers departed September 1, 1944.[569]
A ship, possibly the Black Hawk, the Beru, two destroyers, and one submarine were in port at Manila on September 13, 1941, according to a Japanese intelligence report, and on the same day there arrived an American cruiser of the Brooklyn class, believed to have come from Hawaii.[570] Whether Legaspi Island was being used as a port of call by an American aviation company was the subject of an inquiry directed by Tokyo to Manila on September 15, 1941,[571] Accordingly, Minister Nihro reported the next day that Legaspi was being used as an intermediary station by the Philippine Aerial Taxi Company between Manila and Cebu. It was also noted that the Pan-American Airways were planning to build a landing place at Tacloban in Leyte Province, but as yet had not realized this plan.[572]
The St. Louis, with three other unidentified vessels had left the harbor for Singapore early on September 16, 1941 apparently loaded with food supplies.[573] Since red flags had been hoisted, it was indicated that ammunition was being handled on these ships.[574]
In an intelligence dispatch from Manila on September 20, 1941 Consul Nihro declared that the Phoenix and one other ship were anchored at that port. Another ship, probably the Peters, which entered the harbor on September 18, was reported to have carried 500 soldiers.[575]
On September 26, 1941 Consul Kihara at Davao pointed out that since August, 1941 American destroyer tenders, destroyers, and submarines had entered the port of Davao from the South Seas on every Saturday and had left after about two days. From members of the crews of these warships, he had learned that the warships traversed a route touching Jolo Island, Bataan, Tarao in British North Borneo, and Tarakan, a city in Netherlands Borneo.[576]
[567] III, 339.
[568] III, 340.
[569] III, 341.
[570] III, 342.
[571] III, 343.
[572] III, 344.
[573] III, 345.
[574] III, 346.
[575] III, 347.
[576] III, 348.
[129]
Information concerning the size, tonnage and plane accommodations of the Langley was sent from Davao to Tokyo on September 26, 1941.[577] Consul Nihro advised on October 3, 1941 that he had learned that the American cruisers, the St. Louis and Phoenix, sailing from Manila on September 16 and 22, 1941 respectively, were headed for Singapore. He requested information from Singapore concerning this in order to check on the accuracy of his spy reports.[578] In return it was reported from Shanghai that the United States Army transport, the Henderson, had left that port for Manila carrying 150 Marines.[579]
On October 4, 1941 Foreign Minister Toyoda directed the Japanese Consul at Manila to make a reconnaissance of the new defense works along the east, west and southern coasts of Luzon. The consul was also asked to report on their progress, strength and anything else which might be of interest to Japan.[580]
The Japanese Consul reported that on the afternoon of October 13, 1941 the Houston, Marblehead, and one other vessel, five destroyers, and two minelayers had departed, but that their destinations were unknown. In the harbor on October 14, 1941 were the Black Hawk, four destroyers, ten submarines, the Gold Star, and one other vessel.[581]
A routine intelligence transmission sent to Tokyo on October 17, 1941 reported the Ton, the Maddo, the Hon, four destroyers, five submarines, one minelayer, the Beru and the oiler, Trinity, in port at that time. It was added that large scale barracks were being constructed about 131 kilometers from Manila between Cabanatuan and Laur, and that mechanized maneuvers were taking place between Laur and Aguilla.[582]
(d) Reports from the Hawaiian Islands
149. Japan Notes Activities of French in the Pacific
Consul Nagao Kita reported that taking passage on a destroyer which had left port on September 16, 1941 were Captain C. I. Gargenlieu, high commissioner for Pacific territories under the De Gaulle regime, and Commander G. Cabanier, French Commander of Defense, who were to assume new responsibilities in New Caledonia.[583]
150. Japanese Foreign Minister Requests Special Intelligence Reports Concerning Pearl Harbor
Japanese naval intelligence reports from Honolulu, though few in number, were in the light of the later attack on Pearl Harbor to grow increasingly significant as December 7, 1941 drew nearer. The significance becomes apparent, however, only when reading history backwards.
Concerning Pearl Harbor, Foreign Minister Toyoda on September 24, 1941 directed that in future intelligence reports from Hawaii, Pearl Harbor waters were to be divided roughly into five subareas—
Area A: Waters between Ford Island and the Arsenal.
Area B: Waters adjacent to the Island south and west of Ford Island. (This area is on the opposite side of the Island from Area A.)
Area C: East Loch.
Area D: Middle Loch.
Area E: West Loch and the communicating water routes
[577] III, 349.
[578] III, 350.
[579] III, 351.
[580] III, 352.
[581] III, 353.
[582] III, 354.
[583] III, 355.
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